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Material Lives:  Amending the False 
Claims Act to Restore Qui Tam 
Medicaid Enforcement and Protect Our 
Most Vulnerable Communities  
C. Deen* 
Abstract 
In 2016, the Supreme Court granted cert. in Universal Health 
Services, Inc. v United States ex rel. Escobar to resolve a circuit 
split on implied certification under the False Claims Act. The 
Court’s opinion also addressed the issue of materiality under the 
False Claims Act. The “rigorous standard” expounded by the Court 
raised the standard of materiality beyond simple contractual or 
regulatory noncompliance. This heightened standard represents a 
significant departure from previous jurisprudence. Moreover, the 
heightened standard frustrates the repeatedly expressed will of 
Congress to empower qui tam whistleblowers to prosecute fraud 
perpetrated on the government. The primary focus of this Note is 
the effect this new materiality standard will have on Medicaid qui 
tam actions. This Note proposes that post-Escobar Congress should 
amend the False Claims Act’s materiality definition to return the 
act to the original intention of its drafters. This will allow potential 
Medicaid fraud perpetrators to again fully face the threat of qui tam 
enforcement envisioned by Congress, preventing potentially 




* J.D. Candidate, 2021. This Note is dedicated to the memory of Yaruska Rivera, 
the young woman whose life and needless death are more than case facts. My 
personal thanks are extended to Professor Brandon Hasbrouck for the invaluable 
input, guidance, and mentorship that made this Note possible as well as the 
countless educators, friends, and family for their support over the years. 
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“If ever we are ever justified in reading a statute, not narrowly as 
through a keyhole, but in the broad light of the evils it aimed at 
and the good it hoped for, it is here.”1 
I. Introduction 
Medicaid was created in 1965 as a joint program with state 
governments to provide health care to groups identified by the 
federal government as the country’s most vulnerable.2 Over 100 
years prior to that enactment, the False Claims Act (FCA) was 
passed in the midst of the Civil War to combat procurement fraud 
in the war to end slavery.3 The FCA creates a statutory regime for 
holding fraudulent actors civilly liable in their dealings with the 
federal government.4 These two disparate sections of the law—
 
 1.  United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 557 (1943) (Jackson, 
J., dissenting). 
 2.  See Medicaid.gov:  Keeping America Healthy, CTRS FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.medicaid.gov/about-us/program-
history/index.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2020) (explaining the origins and 
purpose behind Medicaid) [perma.cc/B39N-SPMG]. 
 3.  See infra Part II (discussing the foundations of the FCA). 
 4.  See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (2018) (providing for civil damages for false 
claims and establishing the procedure involved in actions under the FCA).  
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their creation separated by over a century—have come together to 
result in billions of civil settlements and judgments every year to 
recover government funds and dissuade would-be bad actors in 
government-funded medical care.5 The FCA cases currently being 
brought throughout the United States overwhelmingly concern 
healthcare fraud in the systems designed to serve communities 
that would otherwise be denied healthcare entirely.6 The intent of 
Congress to reorient the FCA from guns that do not shoot to 
doctors that do not care is clear after repeated amendments to the 
act.7 
This Note first explores the history of the FCA and the 
contentious relationship between the legislative demand for a 
statute exacting accountability and the judiciary’s strictly 
textualist and originalist reading of it.8 This contentious 
relationship has also resulted in a constant, evolving reorientation 
of the FCA to ensure the empowerment of private individuals—qui 
tam relators—with the authority to serve as private attorneys 
general where fraud is being perpetrated on the government.9  
The most recent salvo in this 150-plus-year argument is the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Universal Health Services v. United 
States ex rel. Escobar.10 The Court expounded upon materiality 
under the False Claims Act as a demanding standard that requires 
a holistic approach that goes beyond even express contractual 
terms.11 The opinion will be discussed in greater detail below, but 
as an introductory matter, it should be noted that the reasoning of 
the Court explicitly embraces a strict textualist reading and 
 
 5.  See infra Subpart II.A (discussing the interaction between the FCA and 
government funded medical care). 
 6.  See infra Part V (illustrating the majority of FCA cases concern 
Department of Health and Human Services program). 
 7.  See infra Subpart II.A (exploring the amendment history of the FCA 
specifically in the 1986 and Affordable Care Act amendments). 
 8.  See infra Subpart II.A (documenting the back-and-forth battle between 
Congress and the courts). 
 9.  See infra Subpart II.B (pointing to Congress’ repeated revision when 
Courts acted to limit the FCA’s qui tam provision). 
 10.  See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. 
Ct. 1989, 2003–04 (2016) (holding that materiality under the act is derived from 
demanding common law antecedents). 
 11.  See id. at 2002–04 (detailing the materiality standard proscribed the 
Court to the FCA).  
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originalist view of contract law derived from English common law 
sources.12 
This Note examines the impact of Escobar’s demanding 
materiality standards both in the government contracts legal 
community generally and in courts hearing Medicaid qui tam suits 
specifically.13 The reception of the legal community outside of the 
courts is an important aspect of the issue given that the legal 
community will shape proactive compliance in the Medicaid 
provider community. The application of the materiality standard 
by courts will only serve as an effective tool where it serves as a 
deterrence for future harms; the reaction of the legal sector shapes 
compliance which may save lives rather than simply monetarily 
punish the providers who take them.14 
The reality of this standard’s effect is illuminated within this 
Note by attempting to—inherently limited by inadequate 
government data collection—examine the issues of fraud and 
quality of care in Medicaid. The limitations on accurately 
estimating Medicaid fraud are explained through the 
government’s own testimony.15 The approach to illuminate the 
dangers of inadequate Medicaid fraud documentation and 
prosecution is made more whole by examining how the groups who 
benefit—and therefore suffer when defrauded—the most from the 
program are our country’s most vulnerable communities.16 The 
direct danger of inadequate Medicaid fraud prosecution will be 
faced not by Congressional appropriations but by communities 
already pushed to the margins of society.17 
 
 12.  See id. at 1999 (starting the analysis with the statute’s language and 
incorporating “well-settled meaning of common-law terms”).  
 13.  See infra Subpart IV.A and Section IV.B.2 (examining the reaction to the 
Escobar standard by the legal community and the application of the standard in 
lower courts). 
 14.  See e.g. John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty 
on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 965–1003 (June 1984) 
(discussing in part the incentivization of undercompliance in sectors with unclear 
legal standards). 
 15.  See infra Subpart V.A (examining the government’s inability to quantify 
the extent of Medicaid fraud). 
 16.  See Medicaid.gov:  Keeping America Healthy, supra note 2 (explaining 
the purpose of Medicaid is to provide “coverage for the poorest Americans”). 
 17.  See id. (explaining the purpose of Medicaid is to provide “coverage for the 
poorest Americans”). 
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Finally, this Note proposes that given the statutory tools 
according to the Court in Escobar, the history of the False Claims 
Act, and the realities to be faced by vulnerable communities, the 
only option left is for statutory amendment. The reality that the 
act covers far more than Medicaid fraud is faced and—what the 
author hopes is—a novel solution is proposed that will respect that 
reality while empowering the Act once again to preserve and 
protect a program which serves as a cornerstone of the Great 
Society Reforms which sought to help bring racial and social justice 
in to the American reality.18 
II. The History of the False Claims Act 
The False Claims Act was signed in to law by President 
Abraham Lincoln in 1863 “to combat rampant fraud in Civil War 
defense contracts.”19 The statute originally provided for both civil 
and criminal penalties with a civil penalty of $2,000 per claim and 
double damages.20 Despite the context of the Act’s passage, the Act 
did not specify defense contracts but applied to “any Government 
agency or instrumentability, quasi-governmental corporation, or 
nonappropriated fund activity.”21 The Act was  
[I]ntended to protect the treasury against the hungry and 
unscrupulous host that encompasses it on every side, and 
should be construed accordingly. It was passed upon the 
theory . . . that one of the least expensive and most effective 
means of preventing frauds . . . [is] the strong stimulus of 
personal ill will or the hope of gain.22 
Critically, the FCA allowed private citizens—known as 
relators—to pursue fraudulent activity in stating that “[a suit] 
may be brought and carried on by any person, as well for himself 
 
 18.  See generally Lyndon B. Johnson, President of United States of America, 
Commencement Address at the University of Michigan: The Great Society (May 
22, 1964). 
 19.  S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 8 (1986). 
 20.  See id. (“The civil penalty provided for payment of double the amount of 
damages . . . plus a $2,000 forfeiture for each claim submitted.”).  
 21.  Id. at 10. 
 22.  United States v. Griswold, 24 F. 361, 366 (D. Or. 1885) (holding the 
purpose of the FCA to be construed broadly over all government fraud). 
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as for the United States.”23 These private citizens were 
incentivized by an accompanying provision allowing a relator to 
collect half of the damages recovered in the action, as well as their 
costs, if they pursued the suit until final judgment.24 The action 
brought by the relator originally belonged to the relator alone 
without any allowance for government intervention.25 Courts went 
so far in this regard that they viewed the action as a property right 
which could not be divested from the relator even if the 
government attempted to settle.26  
The relator provision is known as qui tam from its Latin name 
in the common law:  qui tam pro domino rege quam pro si ipso in 
hac part sequitur.27 The history of qui tam provisions in the United 
States legal system traces back to the First Continental 
Congress.28 The concept of qui tam itself was an element part of 
the common law before the founding of the United States and its 
nature was well understood by both the Founding Fathers and the 
drafters of the original False Claims Act.29 It was accepted that in 
executing a qui tam action the relator was acting in the public 
interest as it “would otherwise be advanced by public officials.”30 
The qui tam provision of the Act was intended by the drafters to be 
 
 23.  S. REP. No. 99-345, at 10 (1986) (citations omitted). 
 24.  See id. (“[T]he private relator who prosecuted the case to final judgment 
would be entitled to one half of the damages and forfeitures recovered and 
collected. If successful, the relator would also be entitled to an award of his 
costs.”). 
 25.  See id. (describing a relator’s rights in a qui tam action at the time of the 
1863 drafting). 
 26.  See United States v. Griswold, 30 F. 762, 763 (D. Or. 1887) (holding the 
prosecution of a qui tam action to be a property right). 
 27.  See Qui Tam Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) 
(translating the original Latin as:  who as well for the king as for himself sues in 
this matter). 
 28.  See, e.g., Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. 336, 341 (1805) (“Almost every fine or 
forfeiture under a penal statute, may be recovered by an action of debt [by a qui 
tam plaintiff] as well as by information [by a public prosecutor].”). 
 29.  See BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *144, *160–61 (“defining the qui tam 
action in English Common law.”). 
 30.  See J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of 
Qui Tam Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 551 (2000) (introducing the changes of 
the 1986 amendments to the FCA). 
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key to the efficacy of the act in order to encourage participants in 
fraud to bring forward the fraud themselves.31 
A. How Guns That Don’t Shoot Became Doctors That Don’t Care 
in Today’s False Claims Act 
In early years of World War II, a number of “qui tam actions 
were brought regarding World War II defense procurement 
fraud.”32 Controversy arose because relators were court watchers 
initiating qui tam suits based solely on the details of criminal fraud 
indictments launched by the Federal government without any 
personal knowledge.33 In Marcus v. Hess,34 “the Government 
contended that an action brought by an informer who based his 
civil action on a criminal indictment should be barred.”35 There, 
the Court refused the government’s invitation to read a personal 
knowledge requirement into the Act.36 The Court’s opinion drove 
the Attorney General—who had aggressively been criminally 
prosecuting procurement fraud—to ask Congress to remove the qui 
tam provisions from the Act entirely.37 After nearly acquiescing, 
Congress refused the Attorney General’s request.38 It did, however, 
amend the plain language of the statute to remove a court’s 
jurisdiction over qui tam civil actions when the government was 
 
 31.  See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 955–56 (1863) (statement of Sen. 
Howard) (defending the efficacy of the qui tam provision in the proposed FCA). 
 32.  S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 10 (1986). 
 33.  See id. at 10–11 (detailing the controversy surrounding World War II qui 
tam suits). 
 34.  United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 (1943) (holding 
the statute did not bar civil qui tam actions based on criminal complaints). 
 35.  S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 10 (1986). 
 36.  See United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. at 545 (“Even if, as 
the government suggests, the petitioner has contributed nothing to the discovery 
of this crime, he has contributed much to accomplishing one of the purposes for 
which the Act was passed.”). 
 37.  See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 11(1986) (“The Marvus [sic] v. Hess decision 
prompted then Attorney General Francis Biddle to request that Congress repeal 
the qui tam provisions of the act). 
 38.  See id. (describing the process of compromise between the House and 
Senate to retain a limited qui tam provision). 
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already knowledgeable and the relator was not the original 
source.39  
Court’s responded to the change in the statute with 
considerable textual discipline and barred a number of qui tam 
actions in the decades to come.40 The status quo on qui tam actions 
finally began to crack in 1984 when the state of Wisconsin 
attempted to file a qui tam action alleging massive Medicaid fraud 
where the state had already disclosed and the Federal government 
failed to act on the information.41 The Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals ruled that despite the Federal government’s inaction, the 
state was barred from bringing the suit having already disclosed 
the information to the Federal government.42 After the decision, 
the negative reaction was swift—resulting in both a condemnation 
from the National Association of Attorneys General and a 
bipartisan effort to introduce reforms which would encourage qui 
tam suits.43  
Congress amended the Act in 1986 in a number of ways 
including increased penalties, removal of specific intent to defraud, 
and imposing liability based on reckless disregard for the truth in 
claims submitted to the government.44 Critically, the 1986 
amendment also abrogated the language the courts had used to bar 
many qui tam suits since 1943 by creating standing again for 
relators submitting information already possessed by the 
government unless it had already been publicly disclosed.45 The 
1986 amendment further encourages qui tam relators by 
guaranteeing costs, expenses, attorneys’ fees, and between 15–30% 
 
 39.  See id. at 8 (summarizing the 1943 amendment to the FCA). 
 40.  See, e.g., United States ex rel. Lapin v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 490 F. 
Supp. 244, 248 (D. Haw. 1980) (holding a relator suit disqualified despite a lack 
of government action to correct the fraud). 
 41.  See United States ex rel. Wisconsin v. Dean, 729 F.2d 1100, 1103–04 (7th 
Cir. 1984) (holding the public disclosure bar in the statute removed the Court’s 
jurisdiction). 
 42.  See id. at 1104 (finding the plain text of the statute indicates a broad 
jurisdictional bar). 
 43.  See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 10 (detailing the reaction by June of 1984 after 
the Seventh’s Circuit decision in March of the same year). 
 44.  See Beck supra note 30, at 562 (introducing the changes of the 1986 
amendments to the FCA). 
 45.  See id. at 562–63 (detailing the differences between the 1943 and 1986 
FCA amendments and their justifications). 
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of the recovery.46 The final change in the 1986 amendment was to 
allow relators to continue as named parties—and beneficiaries— 
even if the government did intervene in prosecuting the suit.47 The 
changes decentralized government fraud prosecution creating 
greater access to information for the government; increasing the 
likelihood of prosecution compared to prosecution by the 
Department of Justice alone (DOJ); and, increasing the incentives 
for whistleblowers to expose fraud.48 
B. The Text of the False Claims Act Today 
By 2009 the changes of the 1986 Amendments to the FCA had 
resulted in $22 billion in recoveries for the Federal government.49 
In 2009, however, the Supreme Court read the FCA narrowly to 
bar suits where fraudulent intent was not present.50 This decision 
was met with a swift reaction from Congress who considered the 
decision “contrary to the clear language and congressional intent 
of the FCA.”51 The Fraud and Enforcement and Recovery Act of 
2009 (FERA) was largely aimed at combatting the mortgage fraud 
leading to the Great Recession of 2008.52 Congress felt compelled 
to revise the False Claims Act in its battle against fraud 
generally.53 “The effectiveness of the False Claims Act has recently 
 
 46.  See id. at 562 (explaining that the statute directs a two-tier range for 
relator’s recovery of 15% to 25% if the government and intervenes and 25% to 30% 
if they do not). 
 47.  See id. (“Even if the Justice Department does intervene, the informer can 
continue as a party.”). 
 48.  See William E. Kovacic, Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits as Monitoring 
Devices in Government Contracting, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1799, 1823–34 (1996) 
(summarizing the effects of the 1986 amendments). 
 49.  See Michael A. Morse & Peter S. Wolff, Fraud Enforcement and Recovery 
Act of 2009 Strengthens Federal FCA, LAWS. J., June 19, 2009, at 5, 10 (“The FCA 
is widely regarded as the most effective tool in combating fraud against the 
federal government, resulting in over $22 billion in recoveries since 1986.”). 
 50.  See Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 
668–69 (2008) (holding that the language “to get” then present in 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3729(a)(2) is an intent requirement). 
 51.  S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 10 (2009). 
 52.  See id. at 2–4 (describing the context of the financial crisis and the 
purpose of the act to combat it). 
 53.  See id. at 4 (“This legislation also makes a number of important 
improvements to fraud and money laundering statutes to strengthen prosecutors' 
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been undermined by court decisions . . . . The False Claims Act 
must be corrected and clarified in order to protect from the fraud 
the Federal assistance and relief funds expended in response to our 
current economic crisis.”54 Congress clearly intended the False 
Claims Act to be actively used and sought to overrule the 
weakening of the Act from the Court’s decision in Allison Engine 
Co.55 The Justice Department agreed that revision to the Act was 
necessary to “aggressively fight fraud in the current economic 
climate.”56 The 2009 bill’s amendments to the Act were intended to 
encourage qui tam suits to pursue government fraud generally.57 
Congress amended the Act only a year after FERA when 
amendments were passed as part of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010.58 Congress’s concerns for 
potential fraud in the medical payment systems within the ACA 
were largely borne out of the decades of experience the Federal 
government had in pursuing Medicaid and Medicare fraud.59 
Congress was careful to point out within the ACA that any 
payments made “by, through, or in connection with an Exchange 
are subject to the False Claims Act.”60  
Congress was largely responding to the strict application and 
narrowing of the statute by the Supreme Court in Graham County 
Soil & Water Conservation District v. United States ex rel. Wilson.61 
 
ability to combat this growing wave of fraud.”). 
 54.  Id. at 4. 
 55.  See id. at 10–11 (“[T]he Allison Engine decision[] runs contrary to the 
clear language and congressional intent of the FCA . . . .”). 
 56.  Id. at 9 (internal citation omitted). 
 57.  See Charles T. Kirchmaier, Treating the Symptoms but Not the Disease:  
A Call to Reform False Claims Act Enforcement, 209 MIL. L. Rev. 186, 217–20 
(2011) (explaining the effect of the 2009 proposed amendments and their effect of 
promoting litigation “as a primary remedy”). 
 58.  The False Claims Act was specifically amended in anticipation of 
increased government healthcare contracts. See Pub. L. No. 111-148, 901–02 
(2010) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2012)). 
 59.  See Lewis Morris, Perspective, Combating Fraud in Health Care:  An 
Essential Component of Any Cost Containment Strategy, HEALTH AFFAIRS, 
Sept./Oct. 2009, at 1352 (discussing federal fraud-control efforts to combat 
Medicare and Medicaid fraud). 
 60.  Pub L. No. 111-148 at 185. 
 61.  See Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex 
rel. Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 291 (2010) (holding administrative reports, hearings, 
audits, and investigations at the federal, state, and local levels all constituted 
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In order to weaponize the False Claims Act against potential ACA 
fraud, Congress passed an amendment that substantially altered 
the public disclosure requirements introduced in the 
Congressional compromise of the 1943 amendments.62 The ACA 
amendment also provided that the government had the right to 
oppose dismissal of the action if the court found that the qui tam 
suit was based on public disclosure.63 The ACA amendment 
“effectively gutted the Court’s Graham County ruling” by 
redefining public disclosure to mean only the news media, federal 
materials, and federal proceedings in which the government was a 
party.64 Finally, the ACA modified the original source doctrine to 
allow relators to bring suits where they had no direct knowledge 
but still “materially adds” to the public disclosure.65 The last 
provision, removing the jurisdictional bar for relators based on 
public disclosures, has had a surprising reception from the 
courts.66 The requirement was intended by Congress to ease the 
burden for relators to qualify as an original source; however, courts 
have instead used the language to impose a heightened standard 
for relators to establish standing in a qui tam suit.67 
 
sources for disqualifying public disclosure under the False Claims Act). 
 62.  See Brett W. Barnett & Jason S. Greis, False Claim Act Litigation under 
the Affordable Care Act, GPSOLO, Mar./Apr. 2015 at 24 (“Prior to the ACA, the 
public disclosure bar served as one of the strongest and quickest ways to dismiss 
a false claims action.”). 
 63.  See id. (“[U]nder the ACA the government is given the opportunity to 
oppose dismissal owing to public disclosure.”). 
 64.  See id. (“[T]he statute now clarifies that public disclosure sources are 
limited to federal criminal, civil, and administrative proceedings in which the 
government is a party; federal reports, hearings, audits, and investigations; and 
news media.”). 
 65.  See id. at 25 (“The ACA, however, eliminated the “direct” knowledge 
requirement, and now a relator can qualify as an “original source” so long as a 
relator has independent knowledge that “materially adds” to the publicly 
disclosed allegations.”). 
 66.  See id. (“[C]ourts thus far have imposed a somewhat heightened 
standard for relators.”). 
 67.  See id. (“Although the ‘materially adds’ requirement was apparently 
intended to ease the requirements for qualifying as an ‘original source,’ courts 
thus far have imposed a somewhat heightened standard for relators.”) (citations 
omitted). 
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III. Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. 
Escobar 
 This Note approaches the Supreme Court’s decision in a 
contextual manner. The case is grounded first in the facts which 
gave rise to the Court’s decision so that the reader might approach 
the case from the same social justice focus which is the focus of this 
scholarship. The legal reasoning and conclusions of the Court 
should not be divorced from the facts of the particular case as it 
sheds immediate light on the implications of the decision in the 
context of Medicaid fraud. Special emphasis is, however, paid to 
the interpretive tools used by the Court to help frame why the 
statutory amendment proposal later in the Note is necessary. 
A. The Case 
Yarushka Rivera was 12 years old when she began receiving 
mental health treatment from Arbour Counseling Services in 
Lawrence, Massachusetts—owned by Universal Health Services—
through Massachusetts’ Medicaid program in 2004.68 In 2009, at 
the age of 17, Yarushka suffered an adverse reaction to medication 
prescribed for a bipolar disorder diagnosis she received at the 
facility.69 After multiple seizures, she died in October of that year.70 
After her death a counselor at the facility revealed to her parents 
that few of the employees at the facility were actually licensed.71 
The “psychiatrist” who diagnosed her received a “Ph.D” from an 
unaccredited internet college, and Massachusetts rejected her 
application for a medical license.72 The “psychiatrist” who 
prescribed the medication that led to her death was a nurse with 
 
 68.  See id. at 1997 (describing the course of treatment Yarushka Rivera 
received). 
 69.  See id. (“Yarushka had an adverse reaction to a medication that a 
purported doctor at Arbour prescribed . . . she suffered another seizure and 
died.”). 
 70.  See id. (detailing repeated medically significant seizures). 
 71.  See id. (“[O]f the five professionals who had treated Yarushka, only one 
was properly licensed.”).  
 72.  See id. (“[F]ailed to mention that her degree came from an unaccredited 
Internet college and that Massachusetts had rejected her application to be 
licensed.”). 
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no prescription authority. Of the five Arbour employees who 
treated Yarushka, only one was licensed.73  
The employees at Arbour had not just lied to Yarushka’s 
parents, they fraudulently represented themselves “to the Federal 
Government to obtain individual National Provider Identification 
numbers, which are submitted in connection with Medicaid 
reimbursement claims.”74 Yarushka’s stepfather—Julio Escobar—
initially reported the facility to various authorities before he filed 
a qui tam suit in federal court based on misrepresentations to 
Medicaid of Arbour’s “unqualified, unlicensed, and unsupervised 
staff.”75 The District Court granted the defendant’s motion to 
dismiss on the basis that none of the violations was “a condition of 
payment.”76 The United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit reversed and remanded the decision based on the lower 
court’s error to consider that the Medicaid regulations were 
material.77 The District Court then found for the United States and 
was affirmed by the First Circuit on appeal by Universal Health 
Services on the basis that regulatory conditions of payment were 
sufficient as “constitut[ing] dispositive evidence of materiality”.78 
B. The Supreme Court’s Opinion 
The opinion of the Court begins with using a “settled principle” 
of statutory interpretation that absent a statutory definition 
within the False Claims Act Congress must have incorporated the 
meaning of the terms according to the common law to resolve the 
circuit split on implied certification.79 The Court reasons that 
 
 73.  See id. (explaining the depth of licensure fraud at the clinic). 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  See id. at 1997–98 (explaining that respondents filed the action after 
discovering that “few Arbour employees were actually licensed to provide mental 
health counseling and that supervision of them was minimal”).  
 76.  United States ex rel. Escobar v. Universal Health Servs., 2014 WL 
1271757, *1, *6–12 (D. Mass. Mar. 26, 2014). 
 77.  See United States ex rel. Escobar v. Universal Health Servs., 780 F.3d 
504, 513 (1st Cir. 2015) (holding regulatory provisions to be dispositive of 
materiality) (citations omitted). 
 78.  Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 
1989, 1998 (2016). 
 79.  See id. at 1999 (“Congress did not define what makes a claim ‘false’ or 
‘fraudulent.’ But ‘[i]t is a settled principle of interpretation that, absent other 
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incorporating the common law definition means “that the implied 
false certification theory can, at least in some circumstances, 
provide a basis for liability” under the Act.80 The heightened 
requirement imported from the common law, however, led the 
Court to restrict the application of implied certification where “the 
claim does not merely request payment, but also makes specific 
representations about the good or services . . . [and] the 
defendant’s failure to disclose noncompliance with material 
statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirements makes those 
representations misleading half-truths.”81 
The second question, however, is whether a defendant who 
fails to disclose a violation of a contractual, statutory, or regulatory 
provision only creates liability when that provision is expressly 
designated a condition of payment.82 The Court finds no basis for 
this limitation in the text but finds within this question an implicit 
consideration of the materiality standard of the Act.83 The Court 
categorizes the materiality simply as “look[ing] to the effect on the 
likely or actual behavior of the recipient of the alleged 
misrepresentation.”84 The Court does not mince its words when it 
explains the effect:  “The materiality standard is demanding.”85 
How demanding is the heightened materiality standard in 
application? In the Court’s approach “when evaluating materiality 
under the False Claims Act, the Government’s decision to expressly 
identify a provision as a condition of payment is relevant, but not 
automatically dispositive.”86 Rather remarkably, this means even 
if the government expressly designates a condition for payment, 
that will not impose liability on its own. The Court explicitly rejects 
automatic materiality even when “the defendant knows that the 
 
indication, Congress intends to incorporate the well-settled meaning of the 
common-law terms it uses.’” (quoting Sekhar v. United States, 570 U.S. 729, 732 
(2013))).  
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. at 2001 (emphasis added). 
 82.  See id. (explaining the question of whether express provision constitutes 
materiality). 
 83.  See id. (“Nothing in the text of the False Claims Act supports [materiality 
by express provisions].”). 
 84.  Id. at 2002 (citing 26 R. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 69:12, p. 549 (4th 
ed. 2003)). 
 85.  Id. at 2003. 
 86.  Id. (emphasis added). 
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Government would be entitled to refuse payment were it aware of 
the violation.”87 “The False Claims Act does not adopt such an 
extraordinarily expansive view of materiality.”88 The Court offers 
only two citations as examples of materiality:  lying about collusive 
bidding and real property title misrepresentations.89 On this 
heightened standard of materiality—which the First Circuit had 
not applied—the lower court’s finding of adequately pled fraud was 
vacated.90 
IV. The Current State of the Qui Tam Suit Post-Escobar 
This section is explored in roughly chronological order. It 
begins with a survey of the reaction of the legal community to the 
materiality standard. The legal community’s response is focused 
primarily on the lawyers who both represent FCA plaintiffs and 
the defense bar.91 The motivation for this approach is based on the 
idea that it is the practicing legal community that will analyze the 
standards and shape compliance efforts initially.92 These proactive 
compliance efforts have the potential to save lives within the 
context of medical practices.93 The Note then moves on to survey 
lower court decisions applying the Escobar standard after 
clarifying the common procedural posture of initial motions to 
dismiss under the heightened fraud pleading standard imposed by 
the federal rules.94 Finally, a brief update is provided on requests 
 
 87.  Id. at 2004.  
 88.  Id.  
 89.  See id. at 2003 (citing as examples Junius Cons. Co. v. Cohen 257 N.Y. 
393 (1931) and United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess 317 U.S. 537 (1943)). 
 90.  See id. at 2004 (“Because both opinions below assessed respondents' 
complaint based on interpretations of § 3729(a)(1)(A) that differ from ours, we 
vacate the First Circuit's judgment and remand the case for reconsideration of 
whether respondents have sufficiently pleaded a False Claims Act violation.”). 
 91.  See infra Section IV.A (discussing the legal community’s response to the 
materiality requirement). 
 92.  See infra Section IV.A (discussing the legal community’s response to the 
materiality requirement). 
 93.  See infra Section IV.A (discussing the effect heightened materiality 
requirement). 
 94.  See infra Section IV.B.2 (explaining the impact of the application of the 
Escobar standard in lower courts). 
MATERIAL LIVES 289 
for the Supreme Court to offer clarification of a standard applied 
divergently across the various federal courts of appeal. 
 
 
A. Immediate Reaction in the Legal Sector 
The legal community expressed uncertainty regarding the 
impact of the heightened materiality standard.95 The new 
materiality standard was seen as “possibly the most significant 
impact of the Supreme Court decision” as a “higher standard” that 
would require the government to “develop evidence of its past 
payment practices.”96 Immediately the legal community recognized 
that “continued payment of claims by the government will provide 
for a materiality defense.”97 
Other government contract legal scholars asserted “the 
[C]ourt actually restricted the FCA’s potential scope through a 
rigorous and demanding standard of ‘materiality.’”98 The impact 
was expected to provide “protection against an overly zealous 
interpretation of the FCA.”99 Indeed some commentators went so 
far as to assert: 
FCA plaintiffs would be well-advised to recognize that even if a 
trial court ignores the Court’s holding and applies a 
less-rigorous pleading standard [on materiality], they face a 
protracted and expensive litigation only to revisit the issue on 
summary judgment and, if necessary, where the circuit courts 
of appeal are far more likely to apply the Court’s test.100 
 
 95.  See, e.g., Cynthia A. Howell, Rough Road Ahead for Businesses?—The 
Impact of The Supreme Court’s Ruling in Universal Health Services, Inc. v. 
United States ex. rel. Escobar, 19 DUQ. BUS. L. J. 97, 114 (2017) (“[T]he Supreme 
Court also implemented a heightened materiality standard. The decision did not 
provide a bright-line rule; therefore, courts will need to adjust to the adoption of 
a subjective materiality standard.”). 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. at 115. 
 98.  Robyn N. Burrows, The Supreme Court Uphold Implied Certification 
Under the False Claims Act but Imposes “Rigorous Materiality” Standard, 
FIDELITY & SURETY L. COMMITTEE NEWSL., Fall 2016, at 10. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  David L Douglass, Defending FCA Claims:  Making the FCA Plaintiff 
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The commentator even provided a sample letter to send to a 
relator’s counsel advising “it is all too often true that it is one thing 
to accuse but a different thing to prove” and “[w]e look forward to 
seeking judicial assistance in resolving this matter; should that 
become necessary.”101 
Simply put, lawyers representing defendants in frequent 
False Claims Act litigation regarded the heightened materiality 
standard as “welcome news for contractors.”102 These litigators 
noted that it was not simply continued payment but also that 
“[g]overnment inaction in the face of noncompliance affords 
contractors a strong materiality defense.”103 The added emphasis 
on materiality and the Court’s own admission that the standard 
was not too fact intensive in note 6 of page 2004 of the opinion had 
“made its mark on FCA motions practice” and when it came to 
dismissal or summary judgment, “courts have shown a willingness 
to do just that.”104 The added emphasis on materiality motion 
practice leads many practitioners to posit that defendants “must 
focus [their] efforts on the discovery and presentation of evidence 
of materiality [by the relator].”105 
The reception was not entirely positive. Government 
practitioners prosecuting fraud under the False Claims Act 
detected the potential for a materiality defense just as quickly as 
defense counsel.106 These lawyers pointed out that potential for 
liability under the Act was of great societal importance given the 
number of elderly receiving elderly care services through 
 
Walk the Talk, FED. LAW., Dec. 2016, at 62. 
 101.  Id. at 59. 
 102.  Brian Tully McLaughlin & Jason M. Crawford, Feature Comment, 
Materiality Rules! Escobar Changes the Game, GOV’T CONTRACTOR, May 10, 2017, 
¶ 135, 2. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id.  
 105.  G. Christian Roux & John. D. Hanover, Implied False Certification 
Liability Under The False Claims Act: How The Materiality Standard Offers 
Protection After Escobar, 38 WTR CONSTR. L. 16, 21 (2018). 
 106.  See Susan Carney Lynch & Ellen Bowden McIntyre, Seeking Justice:  
The Department Of Justice's Civil And Criminal Tools And Strategies To Bring 
To Justice Nursing Homes Who Provide Grossly Substandard Care To Our 
Nation's Elderly Residents, 66 DOJ J. FED. L. & PRAC. 113, 121–22 (2018) 
(“Defense attorneys may also claim that the government continued to pay claims 
despite negative survey findings and, therefore, the FCA's materiality element 
cannot be met.”). 
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Medicare.107 Legal scholars also noted that the Court’s holding on 
materiality “rejected the position of the majority of circuits” in 
designating express regulatory compliance requirements to be 
prima facie evidence of materiality.108 The heightened materiality 
standard was generally regarded as a “shift away from the 
statutory ‘natural tendency’ standard . . . [and] toward a 
materiality standard that requires evidence that the government 
was in fact influenced.”109 Scholars further asserted that the Court 
created confusion in these limited examples by “not go[ing] far 
enough in providing sufficient details about liability that may lie 
between guns that do not shoot and foreign-made staplers.”110 
B. In the Courts 
1. Heightened Materiality Requirements in the False Claims Act 
have a Particularly Strong Effect Coupled with Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 9(b) 
The heightened materiality standard imposed by the Supreme 
Court in Escobar has a particularly powerful effect in pleadings. 
The Federal Rules specify “[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party 
must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud 
or mistake.”111 Courts have been flexible in allowing amendments 
to the initial pleadings given the natural information asymmetry 
 
 107.  See Michael S. Macko & Bianca Valcarce, Using the False Claims Act To 
Combat Fraud By Personal Care Homes, 66 DOJ J. FED. L. & PRAC. 129, 136 
(“Residents of personal care homes depend on their caregivers to provide 
necessities and assistance for their everyday lives . . . residents can be vulnerable 
to abuse and neglect . . . traditional criminal remedies might be the first response, 
the False Claims Act can complement—and, in some cases, even substitute for—
those remedies.”). 
 108.  See Deborah R. Farringer, From Guns That Do Not Shoot To Foreign 
Staplers:  Has The Supreme Court's Materiality Standard Under Escobar 
Provided Clarity For The Health Care Industry About Fraud Under The False 
Claims Act?, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 1227, 1247 (2018) (describing the second major 
holding in Escobar). 
 109.  Id. at 1258. 
 110.  Id. at 1275; David Kwok, Is Vagueness Choking The White-Collar 
Statute?, 53 GA. L. REV. 495, 527 (2019). 
 111.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (specifying the pleading standard for claims of 
fraud). 
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of an FCA suit where the party committing the fraud clearly has 
more information than the plaintiff might.112 Nevertheless, the 
materiality of the false claim is an essential element of a violation 
of the False Claims Act and must be adequately pled.113 Further, 
while materiality can be a factually intensive inquiry, the Supreme 
Court expressly rejected the idea that the materiality or 
immateriality of a false claim was not addressable in a motion to 
dismiss at the pleading stage.114 As demonstrated in the next 
section, lower courts have taken this advice from note six of the 
opinion to heart. 
2. The Reality in the Courtroom is Routine Summary Dismissal 
The potential effect of the heightened materiality standard 
was not immediately apparent to the circuit courts. The Fourth 
Circuit explained “[i]f Universal Health controlled our decisions on 
materiality in these appeals, it is unclear what the impact might 
be” and “the applicable materiality test [from Universal Health] 
verges toward a subjective standard.”115 Nevertheless, applications 
of the heightened standard in the circuit courts suggested strict 
enforcement of the demanding standard.116 Perhaps more 
worryingly to parties on either side, circuit court decisions so far 
suggest a possible circuit split on the standard.117 
 
 112.  See TIMOTHY S. JOST & SHARON DAVIES, MEDICARE AND MEDICAID FRAUD 
AND ABUSE 334 (2002-03 ed. 2002) (“[C]ourts have permitted some flexibility in 
pleading . . . information in these cases is less available to the plaintiff than to 
the defendant . . . [t]he court may at its discretion permit the plaintiff, however, 
to amend . . . when 9(b) issues are raised.”). 
 113.  See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. 
Ct. 1989, 2002 n.6 (2016) (“[P]laintiffs must also plead their claims with 
plausibility and particularity under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 9(b) 
by, for instance, pleading facts to support allegations of materiality.”).  
 114.  See id. (“We reject [the] assertion that materiality is too fact intensive 
for courts to dismiss False Claims Act cases on a motion to dismiss or at summary 
judgment.”). 
 115.  See United States v. Raza, 876 F.3d 604, 620–21 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding 
the heightened materiality of the FCA did not apply to criminal prosecutions). 
 116.  See, e.g., United States ex rel. Dresser v. Qualium, No. 12-cv-01745, 2016 
WL 3880763, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 2016) (granting defendant’s motion based 
on a failure to establish materiality on the grounds the government did not 
explain why the alleged noncompliance was material). 
 117.  See Farringer supra note 108, at 1243–44 (describing the circuit splits 
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In a strict application of the materiality standard, the Fifth 
Circuit held that a failure to obtain expressly required engineering 
approvals during construction of a floating oil facility was not 
material to support a claim.118 Despite the apparent seriousness of 
failing to obtain required engineering approvals for a floating oil 
platform, the court found that the government’s continued 
approvals after learning of the failure failed the materiality 
standard.119 This opinion has seen extensive examination by the 
government contract’s defense bar that sees the heightened 
materiality as a welcome reprieve from False Claims Act 
litigation.120 The Third Circuit also adopted the view that 
continued government payments after discovery of noncompliance 
or fraud are essentially dispositive of immateriality when it 
dismissed a complaint where the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) had consistently reimbursed claims with 
knowledge of noncompliance as well as previous notification to the 
Federal Drug Administration (FDA) and DOJ, which chose not to 
act on the false statements.121 
The Fifth and Third Circuits were not alone in their strict 
application of the new standard. The Seventh Circuit used 
heightened materiality to affirm the granting of a defendant’s 
summary judgment motion on the grounds that noncompliance 
was not material even where it would establish the government’s 
right to refuse payment because the relator “offered no evidence 
that the government’s decision to pay would likely or actually have 
been different had it known of . . . [the] alleged noncompliance 
with [the] regulations.”122 The Circuit for the District of Columbia 
as well found that a claim did not establish materiality when it 
was not clear that the government actually used fraudulent data 
 
over interpretation of the FCA). 
 118.  See Abbot v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., 851 F.3d 384, 388 (5th Cir. 2017) 
(holding failure to obtain engineering approvals not sufficiently material). 
 119.  See id. at 388 (ruling that the district court had correctly granted 
summary judgement). 
 120.  See, e.g., McLaughlin, supra note 102, at 3–4 (including a discussion of 
the Abbot decision). 
 121.  See United States ex rel. Petratos v. Genentech Inc., 855 F.3d 481, 489–
90 (3d. Cir. 2017) (holding continued government payments after the government 
was knowledge indicated immateriality). 
 122.  See United States v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 840 F.3d 445, 447 (7th Cir. 
2016) (holding failure to comply with applicable regulations not material).  
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for payment; even though it was not disputed that fraudulent data 
had been submitted.123 These decisions are even more strict than 
the Fifth and Third Circuits’ approach in that they found 
immateriality based on speculation that the government would 
still pay the claims.124 
While there is apparent potential for a circuit split, it is also 
true that circuits’ applying a more plaintiff-friendly, or even less 
motion-to-dismiss-friendly, approach are in the clear minority.125 
The Sixth Circuit reversed a trial court’s granting of a motion to 
dismiss on the grounds of regulatory noncompliance.126 The circuit 
court reasoned that the discussion of immaterial regulatory 
noncompliance by the Supreme Court did not apply because the 
regulation in question was both an express condition and a 
mechanism of fraud prevention.127 The court considered the 
government’s past payments to offer no support in either direction 
and—in direct opposition to the Fifth Circuit—expressly 
overturned the trial court’s inferences that government inaction 
pointed significantly to immateriality.128 
Perhaps most uniquely the Ninth Circuit has largely taken the 
approach that the Supreme Court’s decision did not change 
anything.129 Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision, the Ninth 
Circuit had looked to its own precedent—United States ex rel. 
Hendow v. University of Phoenix130—when examining cases 
 
 123.  See United States ex rel. McBride v. Halliburton Co., 848 F.3d 1027, 1032 
(D.C. Cir. 2017) (holding relator did not adequately plead material facts). 
 124.  See id. at 1034 (finding immateriality based on the speculative and 
generic nature of the statement); see also United States v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 
840 F.3d 445, 447 (7th Cir. 2016) (stating that speculation was insufficient to 
survive summary judgement). 
 125.  See Farringer, supra note 108, at 1263 (stating that Escobar has changed 
the landscape such that the new standard is dismissing more cases than would 
have been prior). 
 126.  See United States ex rel. Prather v. Brookdale Senior Living Cmtys., 892 
F.3d 822, 836 (6th Cir. 2018) (holding relator’s pleading of regulatory 
non-compliance). 
 127.  See id. at 836 (emphasizing the regulations role in fraud prevention). 
 128.  See id. at 834 (“[T]he government's payment of the claims irrelevant to 
the question of materiality.”). 
 129.  See United States ex rel. Rose v. Stephens Inst., 909 F.3d 1012, 1019 (9th 
Cir. 2018) (stating that their existing precedent was not irreconcilable with the 
reasoning or theory of Escobar). 
 130.  See United States of America ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phx., 461 F.3d 
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sounding in the False Claims Act.131 As that court explained, “[W]e 
view Escobar as creating a ‘gloss’ on the analysis of materiality. 
But the four basic elements of a False Claims Act claim, set out in 
Hendow, remain valid.”132 While other circuits at least all agreed 
that materiality was a heavy burden on the plaintiff’s pleading, the 
Ninth Circuit continues to place the burden instead on the 
defendant reasoning that “[d]efendant has not established as a 
matter of law that its violations of the [regulation] were 
immaterial.”133 
3. The Supreme Court Has Refused to Clarify the Escobar 
Standard 
It should also be noted that the Supreme Court has received 
numerous requests to clarify “unprincipled confusion as to when a 
false claim is sufficiently material to impose liability.”134 For at 
least the third time in the past two years a petitioner requested 
that the Court clarify the Escobar materiality requirement.135 
These petitions have come from the 5th, 9th, and 10th circuits.136 
V. The Need for Qui Tam-False Claims Act Oversight in Medicaid 
The need for qui tam actions to prosecute Medicaid fraud is of 
special importance.137 In the first part of this section, the reality of 
 
1166, 1174 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding the essential elements of FCA liability to be 
(1) a false statement or fraudulent course of conduct, (2) made with scienter, (3) 
that was material, causing (4) the government to pay out money or forfeit moneys 
due). 
 131.  See United States ex rel. Rose v. Stephens Inst., 909 F.3d 1012, 1020 (9th 
Cir. 2018) (holding the that the Hendow elements were not affected by the 
decision in Escobar). 
 132.  See id. at 1020 (stating that the Hendow elements remain valid). 
 133.  See id. (applying the Escobar standards of materiality). 
 134. Daniel Seiden, Supreme Court Passes on Materiality Issue in Medicare 
Fraud Case, BLOOMBERG LAW (Oct. 5, 2020, 9;43 AM), 
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/document/XEUCI1G0000000 (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2020) [perma.cc/6AJS-WC4V]. 
 135.  See id. (listing denied cert petitions since January 2019). 
 136.  See id. (providing a summary of recent cert petitions). 
 137.  See Beck, supra note 30, at 562 (describing the nexus between FCA 
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inadequate government oversight is discussed both in terms of 
simple documentation as well as government prosecution. 
Moreover, this section discusses the current DOJ policies, which 
emphasize the importance of accessibility to justice and the court 
process where the government is less likely to intervene to bring 
the full resources of the United States government against those 
who would perpetrate fraud through a system designed to benefit 
our most vulnerable.138 
A. The Government is Incapable of Adequately Prosecuting or 
Even Estimating Fraud in Medicaid 
In testimony provided to the United States Senate, the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that Medicaid 
represented $596 billion in federal spending in 2017.139 The GAO 
further testified that an estimated $36.7 billion of those payments 
were improper.140 The GAO also testified that Medicaid data 
reporting was inadequate to effectuate proper oversight.141 This is 
a significant weakness given the GAO’s recommendation that 
“CMS still needs to conduct a fraud risk assessment and 
implement a risk-based antifraud strategy for Medicaid.”142  
CMS itself, however, estimates that the Medicaid improper 
payment rate in 2019 rose to 14.9%, which amounts to improper 
payments in the amount of $57.36 billion dollars.143 The problem, 
however, is so systemic that even those numbers are themselves 
 
claims and qui tam suits). 
 138.  See infra section V.A.  
 139.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-687T, MEDICAID:  CMS 
HAS TAKEN STEPS TO ADDRESS PROGRAM RISKS BUT FURTHER ACTIONS NEEDED TO 
STRENGTHEN PROGRAM INTEGRITY 1 (2018) (estimating Medicaid expenditures in 
fiscal year 2017). 
 140.  See id. (exemplifying the challenges of overseeing the program at a 
federal level). 
 141.  See id. (stating the need for improved program oversight). 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  See 2019 Estimated Improper Payment Rates for Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services (CMS) Programs, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. 
(Nov. 18, 2019), https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/fact-sheets/2019-estimated-
improper-payment-rates-centers-medicare-medicaid-services-cms-programs (last 
visited Feb. 20, 2020) (using a table to display the change in improper payment 
rates) [perma.cc/YP3W-HXWC]. 
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flawed and incapable of tracking well-executed fraud.144 CMS 
offers the following disclaimer before disclosing the 2019 improper 
payment rate:  
[I]mproper payment rates are not necessarily indicat[ive] of 
fraud . . . . OMB guidance states that when an agency’s review 
is unable to discern whether a payment was proper as a result 
of insufficient or missing documentation, this payment should 
be considered an improper payment . . . . However, if the 
documentation [of a fraudulent claim] had been submitted and 
properly maintained, then the payments may have been 
determined to be proper.145 
CMS does note the rate captures some fraud, but it offers no 
estimate of what that proportion is to the total it might be nor how 
it might be found in the data.146 
CMS notes that the 2018 to 2019 improper payment rates are 
not comparable due to the shifting nature of the data’s collection 
by sampling of seventeen states at a time with the District of 
Columbia.147 Beneath that, however, CMS reveals that it is 
potential fraud itself which is corrupting the data through 
“[n]on-compliance with newer requirements for provider 
revalidation . . . [and] [c]ontinued non-compliance with provider 
enrollment, screening, and National Provider Information 
requirements.”148 The data that should be used to track potential 
fraud in Medicaid has been rendered potentially incapable of doing 
so by the sheer rate of non-compliance which may be indicative of 
fraud.149 
The government is at least aware of the problem’s scope. The 
GAO’s report to Congressional committees in March of 2019 
continues to list Medicaid program integrity as a “high risk 
 
 144.  See id. (outlining the imperfections in data about improper payment 
rates).  
 145.  Id.  
 146.  See id. (“A smaller proportion of improper payments are payments that 
should not have been made or should have been made in different amounts and 
are considered a monetary loss to the government.”). 
 147.  See id. (“[I]mproper payment rates increased between FY 2018 and 2019, 
these results are not comparable as the measurement as changed dramatically.”). 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  See id (listing non-compliance as one of the factors that led to an increase 
in improper payment rates). 
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area.”150 That high risk is due to the previously discussed data 
issues as well as the prevalence of improper payments and 
appropriate use of funds.151 While the GAO does accept that CMS 
has partially met goals to estimate and address fraud, the auditors 
note that the efforts described are not even capable of adequately 
reflecting the nature of the risks.152 Overall “more than 70 of [the 
GAO’s] recommendations related to Medicaid remain open, and 
several major steps remain to improve Medicaid program 
integrity.”153 
More worrisome is that as Medicaid shifts to managed care—
administered by Managed Care Organizations (MCOs)—CMS 
oversight of those organizations is fundamentally inadequate, 
given that there is no medical review of services purported to be 
performed.154 Examining the issue almost twenty years ago, 
Malcolm Sparrow pointed out “[f]raud perpetrators understand the 
dynamics of false claims extremely well . . . They bill their lies 
correctly.”155 Administrative review alone ensures that “[t]here is 
no reason . . . to believe they will uncover false claims whenever 
false documentation is supplied to match the false claims.”156 In 
one example from 1998 Senate testimony, a provider who admitted 
to committing fraud revealed how easy the administrative-focused 
review of fraud was to circumvent.157 Finally, the effect of the shift 
to MCOs and the accompanying fraud “may be more dangerous to 
 
 150.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-157SP, HIGH-RISK SERIES: 
SUBSTANTIAL EFFORTS NEEDED TO ACHIEVE GREATER PROGRESS ON HIGH-RISK 
AREAS 250 (2019). 
 151.  See id. (“Our recent work highlights oversight challenges in three areas:  
[I]mproper payments, appropriate use of program dollars, and data.”). 
 152.  See id. at 251 (“However, efforts to date do not ensure CMS can estimate 
an improper payment rate for managed care that reflects all program risks.”). 
 153.  Id. at 250. 
 154.  See id. at 252 (“CMS’s estimates of MCO improper payments do not 
include a medical review of services or reviews of MCO records or data, which 
likely minimizes the appearance of program risks in Medicaid managed care.”).  
 155.  See MALCOLM K. SPARROW, LICENSE TO STEAL:  HOW FRAUD BLEEDS 
AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 84 (Updated ed., 2000).  
 156.  Id. at 92. 
 157.  See id. at 92–93 (“In April 1998 . . . Watts, quickly figured out that if all 
the government ever did was compare claims submitted with the medical 
documentation provided . . . all he needed to do, when asked, was fabricate 
documents to match.”). 
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human health than the types of fraud familiar under traditional 
fee-for-service arrangements.”158 
The inability to pursue fraud adequately is not limited to 
CMS.159 The measure of DOJ suits leading to recovery alone 
further suggests that initiating civil enforcement is too large a task 
for the department. The DOJ reported that in 2018 suits pursued 
under the False Claims Act concerning Health and Human 
Services, which includes Medicaid, led to settlements and 
judgments of over $2.5 billion.160 The vast majority of those 
recoveries, however, were launched by qui tam actions and 
constitute more than $1.9 billion, or 77.4% of the total.161 The vast 
majority of the United States’ recovery for fraud perpetrated in the 
health care field was obtained by qui tam actions prior to 
government involvement.162 
It is also not true that qui tam actions are the aggregation of 
small frauds while the DOJ pursues larger fraudulent programs.163 
On January 22, 2019, Walgreens announced a $269.2 million 
settlement of two qui tam FCA cases.164 The relators alleged in one 
case that Walgreens was overcharging the Medicaid program for 
insulin provided to beneficiaries and in the other that they received 
discounts which were not disclosed to the government.165 The fraud 
 
 158.  See MALCOLM K. SPARROW, FRAUD CONTROL IN THE HEALTH CARE 
INDUSTRY:  ASSESSING THE STATE OF THE ART, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE 9 
(Dec. 1998). 
 159.  See CIV. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FRAUD STATISTICS-OVERVIEW:  OCTOBER 
1, 1986 - SEPTEMBER 30, 2018 3 (2019) (totaling qui tam suit recoveries).  
 160.  Id. 
 161.  See id. (offering a total of fraud case recoveries from the spreadsheet). 
 162.  See id. (indicating that larger numbers of recovery for fraud was obtained 
by qui tam actions than those in which the government intervened). 
 163.  See Joan H. Krause, Reflections on Certification, Interpretation, and the 
Quest for Fraud That “Counts” Under the False Claims Act, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1811, 1816 (2017) (stating that qui tam cases are filed by a wide range of 
individuals and entities).  
 164.  See Johnathan Stempel, Walgreens pays $269.2 Million to Settle U.S. 
Civil Fraud Lawsuits, REUTERS (Jan. 22, 2019, 5:04 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-walgreens-boots-settlement/walgreens-pays-
269-2-million-to-settle-u-s-civil-fraud-lawsuits-idUSKCN1PG2PF (last visited 
Feb. 19, 2020) (“Walgreens Boots Alliance Inc will pay $269.2 million to settle two 
whistleblower lawsuits accusing it of civil fraud for overbilling federal healthcare 
programs over a decade.”) [perma.cc/DR4D-SB3C]. 
 165.  See id. (describing the nature of the two lawsuits). 
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perpetrated on Medicaid was so large that “46 states and D.C. have 
joined with the Federal government” as parties to one of the 
lawsuits.166 Despite the immense scope and scale, “the [first] 
investigation resulted from a qui tam action originally filed in 
2012.”167 The second investigation originated with “[t]wo 
pharmacists . . . [and] insulin pens in July 2015” who also filed a 
qui tam complaint.168 In cases of legally proven, admitted, or 
settled fraud, the government is overwhelmingly relying on citizen 
relators rather than government agencies.169 
VI. Medicaid Fraud Inherently Affects and Disadvantages the 
Most Vulnerable Communities 
This section is the most important of this Note. While 
Medicaid definitionally benefits our most vulnerable, it is 
important to document and explicitly talk about what that means. 
The first section discusses the realities of how Medicaid primarily 
benefits not simply the poor, but especially administers social 
justice solutions to racial minorities and those with disabilities. 
The discussion then moves to discuss how Medicaid fraud is not a 
benign threat or simply a taxpayer issue—it results in real 
physical danger to those who use the program for medical care. 
Finally, a brief discussion is included of the systemic and 
existential threat posed by Medicaid fraud to the very existence of 
Medicaid. 
A. Demographic Overviews Reveal Minorities and Disabled 
Individuals Are Disproportionately Affected 
 
 166.  See Jorge E. Perez-Casellas, Managing Director, Ankura, Puerto Rico 
False Claims Act: Perspectives and Implications to your Compliance Program, 
Presentation at HCCA San Juan Regional Compliance Conference (May 16, 2019) 
(available in HCCA archives) (detailing the national reach of Walgreens 
fraudulent dealings).  
 167.  Id. 
 168.  See id. (filing complaint by two pharmacist relators concerning insulin 
pens). 
 169.  See Krause, supra note 163, at 1816 (positing that the qui tam 
mechanism ensures that FCA cases will be filed by a wide range of individuals 
and entities other than federal prosecutors). 
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Medicaid by nature is offered to the most at-risk members of 
the community for whom other health care options are not 
realistically available, and as a result Medicaid fraud is 
necessarily an issue for impoverished communities.170 Mandatory 
eligibility for Medicaid is limited to low-income families, pregnant 
women, children, and individuals already qualified for social 
welfare under the Supplemental Security Income program.171 In 
addition, there are some individuals eligible for Medicaid who—
despite exceeding the poverty threshold—have medical needs so 
extensive that they are effectively rendered impoverished by the 
extent of their care or treatment.172 As a result, the quality of 
Medicaid care is an issue that unavoidably affects the most 
vulnerable communities in America given that they must already 
be living in absolute or effective poverty to even qualify for 
program participation.173 
Medicaid fraud ought to be considered a racial justice issue 
given the disproportionate representation of minorities among 
Medicaid beneficiaries.174 For the fiscal year 2013, white 
populations made up the plurality of Medicaid enrollees at 40%; 
however, the other 60% was composed of 21% African Americans, 
25% Hispanic Americans, and 14% other racial groups.175 During 
the same time period the overall racial make-up of the United 
 
 170.  See Eligibility, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/eligibility/index.html (last visited Feb. 21, 
2020) (citing low income families as beneficiaries of Medicaid) [perma.cc/Y9KF-
KDUL]. 
 171.  See id. (“Low-income families, qualified pregnant women and children, 
and individuals receiving Supplemental Security Income (SSI) are examples of 
mandatory eligibility groups.”). 
 172.  See id. (“Once an individual’s incurred expenses exceed the difference 
between the individual’s income and the state’s medically needy income level (the 
“spenddown” amount), the person can be eligible for Medicaid.”). 
 173.  See id. (listing the groups of individuals who qualify for program 
participation). 
 174.  See John V. Jacobi, Special Feature: Medicaid Matters: Medicaid 
Evolution for the 21st Century, 102 KY. L. J. 357, 360 (2013/2014) (stating that 
racial minorities are among a large percent of Medicaid enrollees). 
 175.  See Medicaid Enrollment by Race/Ethnicity, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 
https://www.kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/medicaid-enrollment-by-
raceethnicity/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location
%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D (last visited Feb. 21, 2020) (providing a 
searchable database of Medicaid demographics) [perma.cc/WE5H-SWGA]. 
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States indicated whites represented 63% of the population, African 
Americans 12%, Hispanic Americans 17%, and all other groups 
8%.176 This indicates that minority groups, traditionally 
economically disadvantaged by societal factors too broad to be 
addressed here, are accordingly disproportionally represented in 
the Medicaid enrollee numbers.  
Moreover, Medicaid fraud is also a significant issue for 
disability advocates.177 For the last year in which data is available, 
the number of Medicaid enrolled children who qualified through a 
disability pathway totaled almost 1.6 million.178 Individuals 
deemed categorically eligible for Medicaid include a number of 
adult disability groups including:  “disabled individuals in 209(b) 
states;” “disabled individuals eligible in 1973;” “working disabled;” 
and “qualified disabled” as mandated by sections of the Social 
Security Act and other government regulation.179 
B. Medicaid Fraud Creates Acute Standard of Care Issues Which 
Can Kill or Injure the Very Beneficiaries Medicaid is Supposed to 
Save 
 
 176.  See Populations Distribution by Race/Ethnicity, KAISER FAM. FOUND., 
https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/distribution-by-
raceethnicity/?currentTimeframe=5&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location
%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D (last visited Feb. 21, 2020) (providing a 
searchable database of demographics for the entire population) [perma.cc/N3H8-
KMXW]. 




2sort%22:%22asc%22%7D (last visited Sept. 28, 2020) (displaying total 
enrollment numbers for people with disabilities) [perma.cc/TA3N-LKXE]. 
 178.  See Medicaid Enrollment of Children Qualifying Through a disability 
Pathway, KAISER FAM. FOUND., https://www.kff.org/medicaid/state-
indicator/medicaid-enrollment-of-children-qualifying-through-a-disability-
pathway/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,
%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D (last visited Feb. 21, 2020) (displaying total 
enrollment numbers for adolescent disabled Medicaid beneficiaries) 
[perma.cc/HQ3Y-WJCM]. 
 179.  See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., LIST OF MEDICAID 
ELIGIBILITY GROUPS:  MANDATORY CATEGORICALLY NEEDY 1–2 (2019) (listing the 
eligibility groups for categorically needy groups and the corresponding Social 
Security Act and CFR citations). 
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The social justice implications of Medicaid fraud should not 
come as a shock. The unique impact of Medicaid fraud on 
impoverished racial minorities is demonstrated in the very case 
that serves as the basis of this Note. The Supreme Court’s decision 
in Escobar ultimately began with the tragic death of Yarushka 
Rivera.180 Yarushka’s parents sought only to help their teenage 
daughter receive counseling services to resolve behavioral 
issues.181 Yarushka was a young woman of color, living in poverty, 
and had she not died after having been wrongfully prescribed, she 
may have received a diagnosis  entitling her to disability 
protections.182 The danger of Medicaid fraud perpetrated on 
America’s most vulnerable communities could scarcely find a 
better example than the young woman whose tragic death 
launched the very case and subsequent Court opinion that now 
makes it easier to perpetrate the type of fraud that led to her 
death.183 
Yarushka Rivera’s story is likely not an anomaly. Data 
collected by the Kaiser Family Foundation suggest that the rate of 
Medicaid beneficiaries receiving anti-psychotic medications—the 
very medication type that caused the seizures which killed 
Yarushka—is more than four times the overall rate in the 
country.184 While there may be a higher incidence of mental health 
disorders among the impoverished, studies suggest that the 
current Medicaid payment model incentivizes providers to 
administer services as “efficiently” as possible—often at the cost of 
quality of care.185 Yarushka’s case illustrates providers’ efforts to 
provide services at the highest profit margin possible by sometimes 
employing individuals who work at a lower labor rate than their 
 
 180.   See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 
S. Ct. 1989, 1997 (2016) (describing the details of Yarushka’s death). 
 181.   See id. at 1997 (detailing how Yarushka became a patient at Arbour). 
 182.  See supra Subpart III.A (detailing the facts of the Escobar decision). 
 183.  See supra Subpart III.A (explaining the details of the Escobar decision). 
 184.  See LIZ BORKOWSKI ET. AL, IMPACTS OF PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETING ON 
HEALTHCARE SERVICES IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 7 (2012) (“[T]he national 
average percentage of Medicaid beneficiaries receiving antipsychotics for all 
states was 5.4% . . . [i]n the general population, an estimated 1.2% of the US 
population filled antipsychotic prescriptions.”). 
 185.  See Sparrow, supra note 158, at 7–8 (explaining the dangers of the 
current CMS payment system which incentivize fraud). 
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qualified peers and may lack the requisite credentials to do the 
very jobs they were assigned.186 
One of the most striking aspects of these acute failures in 
Medicaid-provided care is that the most accurate statistic 
available is the settlement and judgment rate of FCA suits 
concerning the Department of Health Services.187 Those statistics 
alone, however, have serious shortcomings as indicators of acute 
mistreatment.188 That number includes a variety of cases which 
involve overbilling for otherwise adequate products, and there is 
no methodical break down of when false claims in medical services 
cross the line from price fraudulent to the life-threatening fraud 
which killed Yarushka.189 
Furthermore, the demonstrated inability of the government to 
track Medicaid fraud will only further incentivize those who wish 
to engage in fraud.190 Even before Escobar weakened the qui tam 
provision, studies suggested that “[o]ne of the markers of a 
physician’s willingness to ‘game’ program rules is whether more 
than 25% of a physician’s patients are on Medicaid.”191 In other 
words, providers are more willing to engage in Medicaid fraud 
when they have large Medicaid practices, only compounding the 
impact of their willingness to submit false claims. This is a further 
systemic issue for Medicaid funds in any given year.192 
 
 186.  See Universal Health Serv.’s, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. 
Ct. 1989, 1997 (2016) (clarifying that only one of the professionals who had 
treated Yarushka was licensed). 
 187.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 160 (providing statistics of false 
claims recovery in suits concerning the DHHS).  
 188.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 160 (failing to include acute 
mistreatment not captured by the statistics).  
 189.   See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 160 (lacking analysis of the type of 
fraud that occurred in Escobar). 
 190.  See Sparrow, supra note 155, at 102–05 (discussing the incentives of 
fraud where government enforcement is lacking in Medicaid). 
 191.  See Matthew K. Wynia, Physician Manipulation of Reimbursement Rules 
for Patients:  Between a Rock and Hard Place, 283 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1858, 1863 
(2000) (analyzing the rates of physician manipulation of reimbursement rate). 
 192.   See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 160 (showing the figures reported by 
the DOJ in determining allocation of Medicaid resources). 
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C. Medicaid Fraud Has a Chronic, Systemic Impact Which 
Imperils Even Those Medicaid Beneficiaries Receiving Proper 
Care 
DOJ recovery statistics are an indicator of the provable 
drawdown of the finite resources available to Medicaid.193 
Appropriations for Medicaid equaled almost $420 billion in fiscal 
year 2019.194 Even with such large outlays, the borders of 
Medicaid’s capability to adequately serve their legally mandated 
beneficiaries have been exposed due to financial considerations.195 
In Puerto Rico, for example, funding shortfalls could “trigger 
coverage losses of one-third to one-half” of the current Medicaid 
beneficiaries.196 While these shortfalls in territorial Medicaid 
funding are not alleged to have been caused by fraud, these 
examples serve to present the reality that the exhaustion of 
Medicaid funding is a real possibility and that the result is a loss 
of medical treatment for beneficiaries.197 
The danger to the current Medicaid appropriations from fraud 
is not the only funding concern associated with ongoing Medicaid 
fraud.198 Every year, appropriations for Medicaid are derived from 
the political machinations of Congress.199 Ongoing fraud in 
Medicaid consistently draws the attention of a number of 
 
 193.  See, e.g., Kevin D. Williamson, The Facts about Medicaid Fraud, NAT’L 
REV. (Sep. 11, 2016 8:00 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2016/09/medicaid-
fraud-staggering-cost-140-billion/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2020) (stating that 
improper payments under Medicaid are so common that DHHS that it accounted 
for 12% of total Medicaid spending) [perma.cc/W467-7PLU]. 
 194.  See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV.’S, FY-2020 BUDGET IN BRIEF 98 
(2020) (charting the total net outlays of legislative proposals for Medicaid in 
2019). 
 195.  See Robin Rudowits, et al., Medicaid Financing Cliff:  Implications for 
the Health Care Systems in Puerto Rico and USVI, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (MAY 2, 
2019), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/medicaid-financing-cliff-
implications-for-the-health-care-systems-in-puerto-rico-and-usvi/ (last visited 
Feb. 21, 2020) (detailing the Medicaid financial crisis faces in U.S. territories) 
[perma.cc/N5W3-WCY7]. 
 196.  See id. (estimating potential coverage losses due to funding shortfalls). 
 197.  See id. (highlighting the financing challenges following natural disasters 
in U.S. territories). 
 198.  See Rapperport, infra note 202 (reporting the possibility of Medicare cuts 
under the current administration). 
 199.  See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 194, at 12 (recognizing 
that congress has the authority to implement more sweeping changes).   
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publications and organizations who use it as political leverage to 
argue for the diminishment or end of Medicaid entirely.200 Fraud 
serves as effective ammunition in the argument against the size 
and expenditure of the Medicaid program even as the number of 
uninsured children in the country rises for the first time in 
years.201 The danger of ongoing fraud to the Medicaid system is 
potentially existential in an easily foreseeable political 
environment.202 
VII. Resurrecting the False Claims Act’s Qui Tam Provision to 
Combat Medicaid Fraud 
The clearest path forward to making the False Claims Act 
effective to combatting Medicaid fraud is to adopt the proven 
strategy Congress has embraced in FCA’s past:  Statutory 
amendment.203 Congress has regularly amended the False Claims 
Act in response to Court decisions in order to effectuate the 
purpose of the act in changing legal and regulatory realities.204 The 
False Claims Act currently defines materiality as “having the 
natural tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, the 
payment or receipt of money or property.”205 In order to resurrect 
the qui tam provision as an effective tool to combat fraud, preserve 
Medicaid, and help safeguard our most vulnerable communities, 
Congress should amend the False Claims Act’s materiality 
definition to provide clarity that the decision of a government 
agency to expressly designate terms as a condition of payment 
should be considered automatically material in the courts. 
 
 200.  See Williamson, supra note 193 (mischaracterizing Medicaid payment 
data to case doubt on the validity of the program). 
 201.  See Joan Alker & Lauren Roygardner, The Number of Uninsured 
Children is on the Rise, GEO. U. CTR. FOR CHILD. & FAM., (Oct. 29, 2019), 
https://ccf.georgetown.edu/2019/10/29/the-number-of-uninsured-children-in-on-
the-rise-acs/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2020) (showing a rise of 400,000 more uninsured 
children nationwide between 2016 and 2018) [perma.cc/QKA3-C4W7]. 
 202.  See, e.g., Alan Rappeport & Maggie Haberman, Trump Opens Possibility 
of Making Medicare Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2020, at A20 (detailing the 
potential for large cuts to Medicaid funding). 
 203.  See supra Subpart II.A (outlining the history of the statute). 
 204.  See supra Subpart II.A (detailing the history of statutory amendment in 
response Supreme Court decisions). 
 205.  31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4) (2018). 
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In constructing this proposal, it is important to begin with why 
a judicial framework alone will not re-effectuate the purpose of the 
FCA after Escobar.206 It is possible that the Court could apply 
previously utilized reasoning in other complex determinations; 
however, that will also reveal fundamental flaws.207 Having found 
the judicially available tools inadequate, this Note will offer a 
statutory amendment to bring the FCA back to the original intent 
of Congress. 
A. The Status Quo Precludes an Adequate General Judicial 
Framework of FCA Materiality 
In the first instance, judicial adoption of a modified 
materiality standard is likely impossible. The lower courts are 
bound by the decision of the Supreme Court, which decisively 
reasoned in Escobar:  “[s]ection 3729(b)(4) defines materiality 
using language that we have employed [previously] . . . . This 
requirement descends from ‘common-law antecedents.’”208 The 
Court did not discuss what the implications of these common law 
antecedents are beyond offering citations to well respected legal 
tracts.209 Paradoxically, the materiality standard the Court offered 
excludes the black letter rule of the current Restatement on 
Contracts, which allows for repudiation where express terms are 
not satisfied.210 In a footnote, the Court comes the closest to 
 
 206.   Cf.  infra Section VII.A (explaining the inadequacy of the judicial 
framework to re-effectuate the purpose of the FCA post-Escobar). 
 207.   See infra Section VII.A (detailing the rationale for arguing that judicial 
modification of the standard is insufficient). 
 208.  See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. 
Ct. 1989, 2002 (2016) (citing Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 769 (1988)) 
(noting in citation that this language’s application in immigration fraud is 
considered identical by the Court). 
 209.  See id. (explaining materiality through citations to R. Lord, Williston on 
Contracts and the second restatements of torts and contracts respectively and 
reciting their definitions). 
 210.  Compare Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003 (“Nor is it sufficient for a finding of 
materiality that the Government would have the option to decline to pay if it knew 
of the defendant’s noncompliance.”), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§ 253(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“Where performances are to be exchanged under 
an exchange of promises, one party’s repudiation of a duty to render performance 
discharges the other party’s remaining duties to render performance.”). 
308 27 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 273 (2020) 
offering a succinct definition when it quotes Cardozo’s maxim that 
materiality concerns those things that “went to the very essence of 
the bargain.”211 
The critical question, however, becomes what is “material” 
under a statute that governs such a wide variety of contracts where 
the only common feature is federal payment? The government has 
arguably made a good faith effort to provide such a standard in 
contractual express conditions of payment.212 Yet, the Supreme 
Court has said that is not indicative of materiality.213 Lower courts 
applying the new standard have found continued payments to be 
an indicator.214 However, this ignores the reality that inspectors, 
investigators, and the administrative payment structure are 
frequently totally disconnected from each other.215 It is apparent 
that efforts to approach materiality across the divergent fields 
captured by the False Claims Act are hampered by the fixing of 
materiality in common law antecedents.216 Nowhere is this more 
apparent than in its application to the complexity of Medicaid 
fraud.217 
The judiciary has routinely found itself wanting of the precise, 
technical expertise required for legal solutions to problems within 
the policy-laden administrative sphere.218 The FCA far predates 
 
 211.  Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003 n.5 (citing Junius Constr. Co. v. Cohen, 257 
N.Y. 393, 400 (1931)). 
 212.  See id. at 514 (“The express and absolute language of the regulation in 
question . . . constitute dispositive evidence of materiality.”) (citations omitted). 
 213.  See supra Subpart III.B (explaining how express designations of 
payment are not indicative of materiality according to the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Escobar). 
 214.  See supra Subpart V.A (exploring the difficulties of compiling reliable 
data, the complex nature of Medicaid administration, and inadequacy of the 
“improper payment rate” to capture fraud). 
 215.  See supra Section IV.B.2 (documenting lower courts application of the 
Escobar materiality standard). 
 216.   See generally, Escobar 136 S. Ct. at 1989 (holding that materiality under 
the act is derived from demanding common law antecedents). 
 217.   See supra Part III.B (establishing that the FCA incorporates the 
heightened common law definition of materiality); see also supra Part VII 
(arguing that amending the FCA materiality definition needs to be amended to 
provide clarity). 
 218.  See e.g., Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 457–58 (1997) (holding 
administrative agency’s interpretation of its own regulation as authoritative). 
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the origination of what is now referred to as administrative law.219 
From the Court’s perspective, the FCA does not implicate 
administrative law at all, instead developing its foundations from 
contract common law.220 This view wholly ignores the complex 
administrative policy determinations that are the heart of 
Medicaid’s existence.221 It also ignores the complex subject matter 
of medical care organizations dealing with hundreds or thousands 
of patients in at-risk communities.222 Finally, it totally fails to take 
into account the inherent complexity of a program that is 
administered under different regimes by each state, territory, and 
the District of Columbia.223 
Absent new express language to the contrary within the 
statute, lower courts must abide by the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation within Escobar.224 The Supreme Court previously 
adopted a more flexible approach that may have been more 
appropriate for the current realities of Medicaid fraud and the FCA 
generally, but that decision’s reasoning has never been widely 
considered and was obviously not part of the Court’s reasoning in 
Escobar.225 Of relevant difference between that decision and the 
FCA generally, however, is that it concerned an antitrust issue 
over which Congress had specifically delegated its authority to an 
 
 219.   See Malcom J. Harkins III, The Ubiquitous False Claims Act: The 
Incongruous Relationship Between.a Civil War Era Fraud Statute and the Modern 
Administrative State, 1 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 131, 141 (2007) 
(explaining that the rise of administrative law system postdates the FCA).  
 220.  See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. 
Ct. 1989, 2002–03 (2016) (using common law sources to explain the materiality 
requirement). 
 221.   See supra Part II (outlining the history of the FCA’s revisions in 
response to Supreme Court decisions considered contrary to the act’s intent).  
 222.   See supra Part VI (arguing Medicaid fraud leaves patients at risk).  
 223.  See generally CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, MEDICAID FUNDING FOR 
THE TERRITORIES (2019) (outlining fundamental differences between state and 
territorial governments’ administration of Medicaid). 
 224.   See supra Part III.B (outlining the new standard set forth in Escobar).  
 225.  See Ricci v. Chi. Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289, 289 (1973) (holding the 
Seventh Circuit’s stay of proceedings until there is a commission ruling to be 
appropriate) (“[P]roceedings should be stated until the [the commission] can pass 
on the validity of respondents’ conduct . . . determination of whether the 
[administrative body]’s rules were violated as petitioner claims or were followed 
requires a factual determination within the special competence of the 
Commission.”). 
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agency.226 Despite the breadth of the Medicaid program, the 
relevant federal agencies for its administration are incapable of 
fully documenting the program and have no adjudicatory 
powers.227 The solution might be found in the various state 
Medicaid regulatory bodies; but, the potential impact of state 
regulatory bodies in the enforcement of a federal regulation is 
beyond the scope of this Note.228 In either event, the controlling 
decision for the lower courts, Escobar, makes no mention of this 
reasoning. 
B. A Statutory Amendment Will Allow for Reliable and Accurate 
Materiality Determinations in FCA Suits 
Given the practical impossibility of adopting a judicial 
framework to remedy the material problem, the answer is for 
Congress to amend the FCA’s materiality definition to give the 
courts clear guidance. As discussed earlier this is the generally 
accepted approach for adapting the FCA to present realities and 
policy challenges over its more than a century-and-a-half 
existence.229 This Note’s proposal, however, differs from previous 
attempts in that it seeks to recognize the wide breadth of the FCA’s 
covering all government contracts while also allowing for a 
solution to the Medicaid-specific issues that are the focus here.230 
This proposal allows for the government to choose between 
materiality standards where appropriate. This crucially allows for 
contracting agencies to select the appropriate standard and 
provides notice to contractors on which standard they will face. 
 
 226.  See id. at 307 (“Rather, we simply recognize that the Congress has 
established a specialized agency that would determine [whether a statutory 
provision] has been violated or that it has been followed.”). 
 227.  See supra Subpart V.A (discussing the inability of CMS and DHHS to 
document Medicaid fraud). 
 228.  See, e.g., Medicaid Fraud Division, STATE OF N.J. OFF. OF THE STATE 
COMPTROLLER, https://www.nj.gov/comptroller/divisions/medicaid/ (last visited 
Feb. 21, 2020) (describing the work of the Medicaid Fraud Division of the Office 
of the State Comptroller of New Jersey which could potentially offer its expert 
guidance to courts considering the materiality of terms in FCA Medicaid suits) 
[perma.cc/28Y3-36PV]. 
 229.  See supra Part II (outlining the history of the FCA’s revisions in response 
to Supreme Court decisions considered contrary to the act’s intent). 
 230.   See supra Parts V, VI (describing issues within the Medicaid system).  
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This Note proposes that 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4) should be 
amended to include a new subsection while still leaving the 




(A) The term “material” will be interpreted by the courts to 
mean having a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of 
influencing, the payment or receipt of money or property; except 
where subsection (B) is specified. 
(B) When this subsection is specified as governing by the text of 
the contract in question, “material” will be interpreted by courts 
to mean all express terms and conditions of payment. 
This amendment gives a court that is hearing an FCA suit explicit 
guidance on the interpretative framework to use for the term 
“material.” This somewhat unusual solution—in that it provides 
two alternate materiality definitions in a single statute—creates a 
number of advantages that overcome potential objections. 
The FCA covers everything from the medical care of 
vulnerable communities discussed in this Note to the building of 
nuclear propulsion systems for the United States Navy.231 Few—if 
any—statutes still in the United States Code cover such a huge 
number of complex and disparate commercial issues.232 This 
reflects the reality that the FCA was enacted at a time when the 
size and responsibilities taken on by the Federal government today 
would have been unimaginable to the act’s original drafters.233 
Some contracting agencies may want to continue contracting 
under the holistic understanding of materiality of “common-law 
antecedents” as interpreted by the Court in Escobar.234 An agency 
may wish to do so as a result of negotiation, complexity making 
 
 231.   See generally 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2018).  
 232.   See Harkins, supra note 219, at 133 (“Federal appellate and trial courts 
have struggled to apply the FCA in light of these changed 
circumstances . . . tension between the Civil War era FCA and the modern 
administrative state [is evident]. . . .”).  
 233.  See Calfee & Crawell, supra note 19 and accompanying text (describing 
the history of the FCA as originally enacted to capture defense procurement fraud 
in 1863). 
 234.  See Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003 (2016) (interpreting the materiality 
standard of the FCA as requiring a holistic and demanding standard). 
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express terms impracticable, or for any other reason the 
contracting official deems relevant. 
This dual solution, however, also allows for the critical 
automatic incorporation of express terms as material in Medicaid. 
This advantage is especially useful in a program like Medicaid 
where the federal contribution creates FCA liability, but the 
express contract terms are predominantly the concern of the 
administering state agency.235 By giving effect to the express terms 
selected by the states the courts will also be respecting the realities 
of varying state medical licensure statutes and the need for local 
determinations.236 What amounts to the essence of the bargain 
concerning a traveling general practitioner working in a remote 
area of the Mountain West might be different from a specialized 
out-patient clinic in a major metropolitan area.237 When the 
proposed additional material definition is adopted, the decisions 
particular to each community’s needs will be respected through 
express contract terms.238 Furthermore, it is impracticable for even 
a codification as large as the Federal Register to ever accurately 
capture the detail and constant evolution of the medical field.239 
That detail and responsiveness is more likely within the capability 
of state regulators responsive to their local community.240 
Moreover, this new section may allow for lower compliance 
costs.241 By designating the express terms of the contract as 
 
 235.   See Harkins, supra note 219, at 134 (“Hendow permits courts to decide 
whether a claim is false or fraudulent based on whether a contractor was in 
compliance with administrative requirements when it claimed payment from the 
government.”).  
 236.   See supra Part IV (arguing uncertainty about the scope of the FCA has 
created challenges). 
 237.   See supra Part VI (discussing systematic problems within Medicaid).  
 238.   See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 
S. Ct. 1989, 2003 (2016) (“The materiality standard is demanding.”).  
 239.   See Harkins, supra note 219, at 134 (“Recent cases evidence the 
difficulties experienced by courts and foreshadow even greater difficulties if the 
tension between the Civil War era FCA and the modern administrative state is 
not addressed and resolved.”). 
 240.   See Medicaid Fraud Division, STATE OF N.J. OFF. OF THE STATE 
COMPTROLLER, supra note 228 and accompanying text (describing the work of the 
Medicaid Fraud Division of the Office of the State Comptroller of New Jersey 
which could potentially offer its expert guidance to courts considering the 
materiality of terms in FCA Medicaid suits). 
 241.   See Harkins, supra note 219, at 165 (describing the prohibitive cost of 
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material, there will be significantly less uncertainty requiring 
legal counsel.242 The express terms will capture the Medicaid 
provider’s potential for liability.243 Providers will have specific 
notice of the contract terms that would be considered by a court to 
be material in a potential FCA suit. This enhanced certainty and 
the lower compliance costs will also effectuate an important 
Medicaid policy goal:  expanding the provider base.244 With clearer 
compliance standards and lower compliance costs, existing 
providers will be incentivized to fully participate in Medicaid 
programs as well as expanding their existing footprints in heavily 
Medicaid dependent communities.245 Medicaid will be more fully 
capable of fulfilling its promise of delivering effective medical care 
to our most vulnerable communities with such wider and effective 
participation.246 
C. The Clear Results of the Proposal’s Effect on a Hypothetical 
FCA Suit 
Suppose that a provider is administering treatments in an 
out-patient clinic to an underprivileged community using 
unlicensed staff according to state medical licensing standards. 
The provider’s contract with the state Medicaid administering 
agency specifies “in interpretation of this contract by a court in a 
False Claims Act suit, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4)(B) will apply.” 
Members of the community have been using the clinic with 
 
defending an FCA action as a “bet the company cases” which are often settled as 
a business judgement).  
 242.   See id. at 160 (explaining the tremendous potential for liability under 
the FCA if providers run afoul of the government).  
 243.   See supra Part III (discussing Universal Health Serv.’s, Inc. v. United 
States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1997 (2016)).  
 244.   See John V. Jacobi, Mission and Markets in Healthcare:  Protecting 
Essential Community Providers for the Poor, 75 WASH. U. L. Q. 1431, 1431–32 
(1997) (“A decade ago, entrepreneurs saw Medicaid services, particularly in 
primary or comprehensive care, as providing insufficient remunerative benefits 
to be worthwhile . . . Out of religious or social mission, however, a cadre of 
community health centers and community-oriented hospitals provided high-
quality, culturally sensitive care to these underserved communities.”). 
 245.   See id. at 1437–38 (describing the general language and lack updating 
to address this language within the Medicaid system). 
 246.   See supra Part VI (discussing the value that Medicaid provides).  
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unsatisfactory results when suddenly a young woman dies due to 
a prescription signed by an unlicensed and unqualified 
practitioner. The father of the young woman learns the staff is 
unlicensed and wants to bring a qui tam suit to shut down the 
clinic and the equivalent of punitive damages.247  
The would-be relator will need to plead facts sufficient to 
establish a claim for fraud under the federal rules.248 Under the 
current Escobar materiality test, the relator will need to obtain 
significant information about the clinic’s operation and regulatory 
know-how to satisfy the “demanding standard” pleading of 
Escobar.249 The relator may find a competent legal aid counsellor, 
qui tam specialist, or large law firm willing to take his case 
pro-bono; but still, the filing will surely be delayed as the complex, 
fact intensive complaint is drawn up.250 Moreover, the relator’s 
ancient legal right to proceed pro se is practically eliminated by 
these realities. 
Under the proposed language of the new section, the relator 
will only need to allege what he already knows:  the staff is 
engaged in the unlicensed practice of medicine and receiving 
federal Medicaid funds for doing so. The relator brings his suit with 
a qui tam FCA complaint that may even be possible to bring pro 
se. The Medicaid contract specifies the express term materiality 
language of the new statutory language. The district court quickly 
finds that Medicaid expressly requires practitioners receiving 
payments be licensed by state authorities, and the clinic’s motion 
to dismissed is denied.251 The DOJ intervenes and uses its full 
 
 247.  Cf. Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. 
Ct. 1989 (2016) (comparing the facts of this hypothetical are similar to those 
found). 
 248.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (establishing the particularity requirements of 
pleading fraud). 
 249.  See supra Subpart IV.B (exploring the application of the Escobar 
standard in lower courts to dismiss FCA suits); see also supra note 100 and 
accompanying text (describing the steps necessary to have a proper FCA claim).  
 250.   See Harkins, supra note 219, at 165 (describing the prohibitive cost of 
defending an FCA action as a “bet the company cases” which are often settled as 
a business judgement). 
 251.  The reality of how quickly a court can dispose of materiality when 
express conditions of payment are automatically dispositive of materiality are 
laid bare in the First Circuit opinion which preceded the Supreme Court’s opinion 
and was noted earlier in this Note. See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United 
States ex rel. Escobar, 780 F.3d 504, 514 (“The express and absolute language of 
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resources to prosecute the suit to the fullest extent of the law. The 
relator receives his share of damages as granted by statute, which 
he uses to help his family recover from the loss of their daughter.252 
Even if the defendant appeals, the reviewing court will be able to 
affirm the trial court’s determination easily instead of engaging in 
a complex, holistic review of the finding of materiality. 
Importantly, this explicit resolution also provides a clear 
deterrence effect to other Medicaid providers in the area.253 
Medicaid providers would be strongly disincentivized from 
providing care that falls short of the express contractual 
requirements. The standard of care is raised, and the physical and 
mental health of a previously underserved community is improved. 
The potential benefits of increased healthcare in underprivileged 
communities are difficult to overstate and their discussion here is 
beyond the scope of this Note, but it must suffice to point out that 
wisdom of such a policy has underwritten Medicaid’s fifty-five-year 
existence across administrations of both political parties, 
presidents with differing goals, and Congressional appropriations 
in economic climates both good and bad. 
VIII. Conclusion 
People want to know under what circumstances and how far 
they will run the risk of coming against what is so much 
stronger than themselves . . . . You can see very plainly that a 
bad man has as much reason as a good one for wishing to avoid 
an encounter with the public force . . . . A man who cares 
nothing for an ethical rule which is believed and practised by 
his neighbors is likely nevertheless to care a good deal to avoid 
being made to pay money.254 
 
the regulation in question . . . constitute dispositive evidence of materiality.”) 
(citations omitted). 
 252.  See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2018) (establishing the award to the qui tam 
plaintiff). 
 253.  See generally Richard Craswell & John E, Calfee, Deterrence and 
Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J. L., ECON., & ORG.’S, no. 2 (Fall 1986) (detailing 
the enhanced deterrence of clear and certain legal standards in complex 
regulatory environments). 
 254.  Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 
459 (1897). 
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Medicaid was enacted to help provide medical care for our 
most vulnerable communities.255 It has helped reinforce the social 
contract and reaffirmed our commitment as a nation of working to 
ensure that in this country poverty need not be a death penalty. 
The False Claims Act was enacted to help win a war against 
slavery.256 Today qui tam relators in Medicaid suits seek to use it 
to help win a war against poverty and injustice effectuated by those 
who would use fraud to rob them of adequate medical care.257 
A statutory amendment reinstating the clear purpose and 
intended effect of the act will once again turn Lincoln’s Law into a 
powerful weapon against other common enemies of this country:  
poverty and social injustice. By providing clear punishment for 
those who would take advantage of our nation’s commitment to 
those most vulnerable among us, the False Claims Act can once 
again serve to deliver results and help achieve victory for a country 
in what has been its longest war. 
 
 255.   See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing the goals of 
Medicaid).  
 256.   See Harkins, supra note 219, at 139 (“The FCA is a Civil War era 
statute . . . .”).  
 257.   See supra Part VII (arguing that the qui tam provision is a means to 
combat fraud in Medicaid). 
